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Abstract — Industrial Control Systems (ICS) encompassing 
resources for process automation are subjected to a wide variety 
of security threats. The threat landscape is arising due to 
increased adoption of Commercial-of-the-shelf (COTS) products 
as well as the convergence of Internet and legacy systems. 
Prevalent security approaches for protection of critical 
infrastructure are scattered among various subsystems and 
modules of ICS networks. This demands a new state-of-the-art 
cybernetic model of ICS networks, which can help in threat 
analysis by providing a comprehensive view of the relationships 
and interactions between the subsystems. Towards this direction, 
the principles of the Viable System Model (VSM) are applied to 
introduce a conceptual recursive model of secure ICS networks 
that can drive cyber security decisions.  
Keywords—Control systems, Critical infrastructure protection; 
Viable System Model; ICS networks; Cyber security; 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are an integral part of a 
nation's critical infrastructure providing requisite resources for 
process control automation of critical entities like power grids, 
emergency communications systems, air traffic control 
networks, nuclear power plants etc. Control & Instrumentation 
(C&I) systems of critical infrastructure are so vital that the 
potential disruption of such entities would have a debilitating 
impact on national security, industrial economy, public safety 
etc. and hence need to be protected from deliberate sabotage 
attacks. Historically, C&I systems were closed and often built 
on specialized proprietary protocols and interfaces. However, 
nowadays C&I systems are adopting components from open 
Commercial-of-the-shelf (COTS) technology for increased 
flexibility and cross platform compatibility. The old esoteric 
systems are being replaced with new open products that have 
connectivity to corporate intranets and, in some cases, the 
public Internet. However, this paradigm shift in adopting 
openness and Internet connectivity is achieved at the cost of 
decreased security against digital intrusion. Modern embedded 
systems are riddled with vulnerabilities, which are subjected to 
potential cyber threats like state-sponsored external attacks as 
well as malicious insider threats. Hence, it has become a 
challenge for researchers to introduce requisite security and 
sufficient safety features in modern ICS networks to counter 
the newly posed threats. Furthermore, since the C&I systems 
typically have much longer life cycle than commercial IT 
systems, there is an increasing demand for a security assurance 
model of ICS networks that encompasses the entire running 
cycle of C&I systems. 
Majority of the prevalent ICS security approaches are 
adaptations of conventional methods for securing traditional IT 
systems which address only a part of the threat landscape and 
are not specifically tailored for elements of ICS networks like 
sensors/actuators etc. Also in traditional ICS network designs 
the identification of threats and vulnerabilities is conducted in 
each domain of the ICS network separately and independently, 
omitting the interactions between the underlying field 
components. Therefore, a novel holistic approach that can 
overcome these drawbacks of past approaches is the need of 
the hour for ICS network security. 
Hence, this article introduces a conceptual recursive model 
of a secure ICS network that can withstand the challenges of 
modern threats by adopting the principles of Viable System 
Model (VSM). Towards this direction, an intuitive 7-level 
secure network design model is proposed that provides a 
holistic view of the critical sections of ICS networks. The 
proposed model uses the cybernetic construct of VSM to 
methodologically emphasize the relationships and interactions 
between different entities within & outside the ICS 
Infrastructure system. The article demonstrates how a layered 
design principle can ease threat visualization & help increase 
security assurance at all levels. 
 More specifically, this article’s key contributions are: 
• A formal demonstration of the seven-layered 
cybernetic model of ICS networks based on VSM 
principles. 
• Illustration of recursive relationships and 
interactions between the different C&I systems at 
each layer of VSM. 
• Threat analysis of all layers regarding 
susceptibility to modern cyber attacks and how to 
combat them. 
II. BACKGROUND ANALYSIS 
Government organizations that deal with critical 
infrastructure nowadays confront targeted-attacks like 
Advanced Persistent Threats (APT), which are destined for 
specific industrial sabotage. APTs are coordinated cyber 
attacks that target the specific industry over a persistent time 
period of months or even years and try to penetrate into the 
ICS network stealthily using advanced malware that exploit 
zero-day vulnerabilities. C&I systems comprise a plethora of 
loosely coupled COTS systems like Supervisory Control And 
Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, Programmable Logic 
Controllers (PLCs), Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) etc. that 
demand for 24/7 remote access for engineering, operations or 
technical support and hence are jellied with the corporate 
network. As the modern dynamics of ICS networks is moving 
towards this sort of interconnected architecture, it is indirectly 
opening doors for the external attackers to penetrate. Further, 
since COTS technology is open and flexible, software driven 
C&I systems are now being subjected to hacking and targeted 
attacks like APTs much more than before. 
Another contemporary threat faced by ICSs is that of 
Insider attacks. Insiders are confided members/operators who 
have administrative credentials to resources and knowledge 
about the network architecture. An insider with malicious 
intent can be very dangerous to the security of ICS networks. 
With the adaptation of novel technologies, threats to C&I 
systems may also arise due to negligent operational mistakes, 
inappropriate testing, wrongly defined security policy and 
even lack of knowledge about information security. These 
inherent threats if exploited, may not only partially paralyze 
the services but may introduce catastrophic failure of other 
critical infrastructure services due to cascading effects of the 
inter-related functional areas. 
Ralph [1] explains the devastating success of Stuxnet 
malware that was used to infect the SCADA systems of Iran's 
nuclear facilities. Stuxnet contained a PLC rootkit that led the 
centrifuges to spin out of control and ultimate reactor 
meltdown. The proliferations of sophisticated Stuxnet-like 
malware such as Duqu, Flame, and Gauss in recent years 
reveal the imminence of modern threats and the shortcomings 
of our detection and response counter-measures. Hence, in 
order to address ICS security, it is indeed a necessity for 
organizations to adopt a defensive security framework that can 
maintain the confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) of 
information at all levels. The intrusions and risks can be 
mitigated only by a proactive defense-in-depth approach 
starting from the bottom level of field data acquisition to the 
top level of data sharing with the external world. Considering 
the fact that ICSs are often very long-lived installations and 
the duration of innovation cycles in ICSs is very different 
from those in conventional Information and Communication 
technology (ICT), this new level of demand for security 
assurance has necessitated the requirement to build up a secure 
ICS network model that is viable enough to generate effective 
deterrents and countermeasures against the known threats. 
Critical Infrastructure security assurance and risk 
assessment methods are divided into two distinct categories 
viz. the sectorial approach referring to those which treat each 
sector separately and the flow approach that follows a 
systemic approach examining ICSs as interconnected 
networks. Most prevalent approaches [2] fall into the first 
category, which has limitations when it is applied in cross-
sectorial environments. The resilience concerns are not 
addressed or exist only implicitly. Wang [3] proposed an 
excellent simulation environment for SCADA security 
analysis taking into account the interdependencies to an extent 
and provided resilience by focusing on network 
communications, but without considering cyber-threats that 
are not network-driven. The proposed model described in this 
article falls in the second category that utilizes VSM in a much 
more flow-oriented manner for identification of threats. The 
inherent scalable nature of the VSM ensures resilience 
whereas its systemic behavior allows the investigation of the 
critical components and emerging interconnections. 
 
The VSM paradigm 
Stafford Beer [4] originally designed the Viable System 
Model (VSM) to model the viability of an autonomous system. 
A viable system needs to meet the demands of survival in a 
changing environment and must be adaptable. The VSM 
expresses a cybernetic model for viable systems that is capable 
of autonomy and divides this system into three fundamental 
parts viz. Management, Operations and Environment as shown 
in Fig. 1a. The Operations part involves all the jobs that take 
Fig. 1 (a) Typical Viable System Model (VSM); (b) Systemic representation of recursive nature of VSM 
 
place inside the system while the Management part controls 
operations, ensures stability, facilitates adaptations to the future 
trends and structures the organizational policies. The 
Environment entails all the external entities that exchange data 
with the system.  
Another important aspect related to VSM is that of 
recursivity, which is based on the premise that all autonomous 
systems are composed of a series of sub-systems, each having 
self-organizing and self-regulatory characteristics. Each of the 
sub-systems contain further sub-systems, and so on, right down 
to the level of the last viable component and at whatever level 
they occur, are by definition autonomous. All the viable sub-
systems contain the capacity to adapt to the changes and deal 
with the complexity relevant for their autonomous functioning. 
Fig. 1b depicts a visual representation of the recursive nature of 
the VSM.  
The VSM provides a comprehensive tool to specify 
information flows, design system strategies and examine 
missing components. The inherent dynamics of VSM can be 
used to expose vulnerabilities of an ICS network by modeling 
cyber-attacks against the various systems of the model.  Bill & 
Matthew [5] exemplified the use of VSM in cyber-security 
domain, as a framework for analysis of potential vulnerabilities 
to an organization’s information systems. Their work is limited 
to a single VSM disregarding its recursive nature and does not 
provide any information regarding the VSM’s relationship with 
the environment as well as other organizations. In another 
approach [6] the authors have shown the use of VSM to model 
Information Security Governance by adopting and simulating 
the standard BS ISO/IEC 27035. Since their research follows a 
checklist-based approach using the implementation of a 
security standard to model the VSM, it focuses exclusively on 
compliance measures and omits information regarding 
technical protection mechanisms. Also, their work focuses on a 
typical corporate network and is not specifically tailored for 
ICS networks. In yet another approach [7], the authors used 
VSM as a framework for enhancing traditional risk assessment 
methods of SCADA systems. In this work, only the SCADA 
server was modeled as VSM for identification of risk agents 
without the consideration of other ICS components. 
Hence, we introduce a recursive model of secure ICS 
networks by comprehensively modeling the critical cyber-
physical systems layer-by-layer in a novel manner. 
Furthermore, the proposed model takes into consideration the 
relationships and interactions between the different entities 
within and outside the ICS infrastructure, and hence provides a 
holistic view of ICS networks. 
 
III. PROPOSED VSM FOR ICS NETWORKS 
In ICS security a gap exists between academia and 
industrial practice. Academic research focuses on highly 
sophisticated attacks and countermeasures, whereas the failure 
of many real-world deployments is due to a lack of the simplest 
security best practices. To close this gap, a layered defense-in-
depth framework is required, which can simplify the 
identification of feasible best practices. Generally, operations 
team always has high availability and reliability in mind, with 
low downtime mandates and cyber-security is not a significant 
concern for them. Hence, introduction of security into C&I 
systems requires tight integration of security and control 
system expertise to address security risks and needs. 
With the introduction of IT controls in industrial processes 
several best-practice system models have emerged that rely on 
isolation. In the proposed VSM this concept of isolation is 
further extended into segregated recursive layers as per the 
viability of ICS network. The proposed ICS VSM is stratified 
into 7 levels of recursion labeled from L7 to L1 as follows: 
• L7 ICS Network Management 
• L6 IT Operation Network 
• L5 ICS-DMZ Operations 
• L4 Production Operations 
• L3 Process Control Network 
• L2 Control System Network 
• L1 Device Network. 
 
L7 ICS Network Management 
The L7 layer provides the overall view of ICS enterprise 
network, addressing all the upper level systems starting from 
IT Operations Network (L6) to the Field Device Network (L1). 
Fig. 2 depicts the top level VSM representation of ICS 
enterprise, which is divided into three parts viz. 'L7 ICS 
Network Management', 'Operational Units' and 'Controllers & 
Dependencies' (Environment) based on VSM principles. Each 
Operational Unit recursively functions as a VSM in itself. 
Quality control and inspection audits of all Operational Units 
are coordinated through the Executive Directors whereas, 
market analysis and competitor assessment are carried out by 
the Marketing & Planning Directors.   
At first glance, VSM at this top level may seem simple and 
obvious. However, the lack of an overall well-coordinated 
system may result in significant effects to the operations in 
lower layers. For example, a less effective inspection of 
internal security systems may result in existence of unnoticed 
critical vulnerabilities, which could have been protected from 
exploitation if requisite initiatives were taken on time. Thus, 
even at this level threats that derive from poor organizational 
management of the ICS enterprise can be identified. For 
security assurance at this layer, the enterprise must ensure 
Fig. 2 VSM for L7 ICS Network Management 
 
compliance to policies relating to information security 
standards & must conduct regular audits to inspect and verify 
security operations in lower layers. 
 
L1 Device Networks 
The L1 layer represents the VSM of field device network 
consisting of sensors and actuators for monitoring & control of 
physical processes. Sensors and actuators are generally wired 
directly to microprocessor-based controllers called IEDs 
(Intelligent Electronic Devices). IEDs receive data from 
sensors and can issue control commands to actuators, such as 
tripping circuit breakers if they sense voltage, current, or 
frequency anomalies in order to maintain the desired values. 
The IEDs are closely linked with real-time systems called 
PLCs & RTUs for centralized control. PLCs use Fieldbus 
communication protocols to communicate with array of field 
devices. RTUs are more suitable for wide geographical 
telemetry and often use wireless communications.  Fig. 3 
depicts the VSM representation of the field network, which is 
divided into three parts viz. 'L1 Device Network' 
(Management), 'Devices' (Operations) and 'Field Entities' 
(Environment) as per VSM design principles. 
The impact of cyber-attacks in L1 layer is much higher, 
because it can directly disrupt physical processes. Generally, 
field devices apply COTS components to custom boards with 
processor architectures like ARM, Power, Motorola 68k etc. 
similar to those in non-ICS embedded systems. Most of these 
field devices implement only rudimentary security features, 
such as requiring a passcode to alter configuration, and some 
do not have any security protections. Evident attacks [8] 
exploiting these inherent hardware flaws violate the often-
made wrong assumption that field devices aren’t vulnerable 
because they are isolated from the business network & Internet. 
Thus, it is necessary to implement security controls at this 
essential layer considering the criticality of physical processes. 
Some security control measures may be like implementing 
granularity control of bandwidth with restrictions in the rate of 
flow of information (up to a very low order of few bits per 
second) sufficient enough to cater transmission of field data. 
Also, the more susceptible wireless communication devices can 
be minimized or barred wherever possible to prevent digital 
intrusion. 
 
L2 Control System Network 
The L2 layer represents the VSM of control system 
network consisting of various control modules like sensor 
control, drive control, batch control, safety control etc. as 
shown in Fig. 4. The VSM is divided into three parts viz. 'L2 
Control System Network' (Management), 'Control System 
Modules' (Operations) and 'Control Entities' (Environment). 
The telemetry data received by PLCs of each control module 
are deterministically processed in real-time using control logic 
algorithms and ladder logic sequences stored in PLCs' memory. 
Most PLCs are programmed using application software 
running on personal computers called PLC Terminals which 
are connected to the PLC through Ethernet, RS-232 or RS-485 
cabling.  
The control algorithms running in the PLCs of L2 control 
modules determine the critical functioning of C&I systems. 
Most deployed PLCs contain COTS Operating Systems like 
VxWorks and OS-9 as well as embedded Windows and Linux 
variants. Vulnerabilities and exploits for these Operating 
Systems (OSs) exist much as they do for regular desktop OSs 
such as Microsoft Windows. PLCs can be attacked indirectly 
by gaining control of terminals that communicate with them. 
This is what happened in the case of Stuxnet worm. Currently 
many PLCs accept new logic without any authentication, and 
often don’t allow inspection of their state. Hence, in order to 
protect control module PLCs, communication and interaction 
among them should be secure and trustworthy. Trustworthiness 
can be implemented through the use of software or hardware 
such Hardware Security Modules (HSM). Any new code 
update should be authenticated and authorized using 
cryptographic techniques before execution. Though 
cryptographic techniques can be resource intensive for PLCs, 
but if algorithms and protocols are rightly optimized it is worth 
the security. Integrity checks for executable software can also 
be enforced at boot up time.  
 
Fig. 4 VSM for L2 Control System Network  
Fig. 3 VSM for L1 Device Network 
L3 Process Control Network 
The L3 layer represents the VSM of process control 
network that is used to transmit instructions to the L2 control 
network using centralized SCADA systems. Fig. 5 depicts the 
VSM, which is divided into three parts viz. 'L3 ICS Network 
Management', 'Process Control Systems' (Operations) and 
'Process Controls' (Environment) as per VSM design 
principles. The L3 layer consists of systems like Batch 
management systems, Alerting, Alarm systems, Historian 
Archive systems etc., which interact and communicate with L2 
controls. The key requirements for this layer are robustness and 
determinacy. Robustness involves connection redundancy, 
reduced sensitivity to Electromagnetic Interference (EMI), 
good error checking & correction etc. whereas determinacy 
involves guaranteed network access, high availability of 
priority systems etc.  
 As C&I systems are discontinuing the use of proprietary 
protocols and adopting new COTS components for increased 
flexibility, exposure to cyber threats has increased. Many 
modern data acquisition systems of process control network 
rely on Ethernet, TCP/IP, and Windows technology instead of 
old serial communication protocols like Modbus, and hence are 
more vulnerable due to interoperability with regular IT 
network. In addition to this, legacy devices and protocols bear 
a variety of vulnerabilities, which are difficult or even 
impossible to be patched due to lack/end of support. In many 
cases, replacement of these legacy systems with new, more 
secure systems just isn’t feasible. Also, it's evident that legacy 
systems are insecure-by-design and as replacements are not 
always possible, they must be secured by indirect means. 
Secure communication technologies like Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) can be established based on electronic 
certificates, digital signatures and cryptographic keys. 
Application whitelisting is another security control that may be 
implemented in this layer. Also, operations team must not 
assume security just by ensuring obscurity of protocols, 
isolation of networks, and assuming disinterest in potential 
attackers. Rather, they must proactively plan for prevention of 
sophisticated cyber-attacks and spread requisite awareness. 
 
L4 Production Operations 
The L4 layer represents the VSM of the Production 
operations of an ICS enterprise like Distributed Control System 
(DCS) management, Asset management, Quality & Reporting 
etc. Fig. 6 depicts the VSM, which is divided into three parts 
viz. 'L4 Production Operations' (Management), 'Production 
Systems' (Operations) and 'Control Room Systems' 
(Environment). ICS control rooms or supervisory stations 
consist of multiple servers, distributed software applications, 
various electronic knobs, switches, HMI panels, large displays 
etc. Servers are often configured in a dual-redundant or hot-
standby mode for providing high availability (continuous 
control and monitoring) in case of a server malfunction or 
hardware failure. The operators interact with SCADA systems 
through the HMI displays to remotely operate field systems, 
troubleshoot problems, develop and initiate reports, and 
perform other operations related to centralized administration 
of distributed C&I systems.  
The HMI screens provide the easiest method for clear 
understanding of the underlying C&I processes. Each ICS 
vendor uses different schema and naming conventions for the 
SCADA points database in Historian servers, but nearly every 
C&I system assigns each sensor, pump, breaker, etc., a unique 
number. On the communications protocol level, the field 
devices are simply referred to by that unique number. An 
attacker that gains a foothold on HMI systems directly or 
indirectly can quite easily discover the point reference numbers 
and hence exploit the SCADA systems. Generally, L4 
production systems are protected by isolating network 
interfaces with multi degree firewalls into a separate De-
Militarized Zone (DMZ) to segregate them from the L3 
Process Control Network.  
L4 Production systems face a major threat from insiders. 
Examples include disabling of air conditioning in a data center 
or allowing chemical processes to occur longer than equipment 
tolerance levels etc. Insiders may even alter information about 
key processes at the source of the data to present different 
information to production systems and hence mislead other 
operators. Therefore, specific access rights to system 
administration and documents containing operating procedures, 
blueprints, ladder logic diagrams, etc. of critical systems should 
be limited by the principle of least privilege and separation of 
duties. Log analyzer tools must be used for monitoring of 
system logins, suspicious behavior patterns, new system 
Fig. 6 VSM for L4 Production Operations 
Fig. 5 VSM for L3 Process Control Network  
connection attempts etc. Such monitoring technologies are also 
introducing capabilities to integrate with physical security 
systems. For example, initiating a monitoring sequence to 
follows the operator’s access to specific buildings, rooms and 
workstations based on RFID badge swipe timings. This access 
can be automatically validated, logged and then compared 
against the employee’s approved work schedule. 
 
L5 ICS-DMZ Operations 
The L5 layer represents the VSM of De-Militarized Zone 
(DMZ) Operations of an ICS datacenter, which isolate and 
protect the ICS perimeter network from the regular enterprise 
IT network. Fig. 7 depicts the VSM, which is divided into three 
parts viz. 'L5 ICS-DMZ Operations' (Management), 'DMZ 
Servers/Systems' (Operations) and 'Perimeter Network' 
(Environment). The L5 DMZ Operations include firewall 
administration, Intrusion detection & prevention (IDS/IPS), 
Network Access Control (NAC), sandboxing operations, 
update services & patch management etc. Modern control 
centers use a combination of Unix, Windows, and web-based 
management tools for centralized administration and security 
of L4 production servers.  
Inspectability, the capability to monitor a system’s internal 
state is the backbone of traditional security tools. Most desktop 
security tools observe the behavior, output, and code signature 
patterns of system processes. This is how virus scanners 
identify malware and how integrity checkers identify 
modifications to important system files. Similarly, network 
intrusion detection systems rely on the ability to inspect 
network traffic. Forensics and reverse-engineering tools too 
require the ability to inspect code and binaries both statically & 
dynamically as they run on a system. Embedded systems and 
legacy devices are much less inspectable than desktop 
computers due to lack of tools and suitable interfaces. Hence, 
inspection capability is generally possible only in higher VSM 
levels above L3. Some control system vendors have started 
addressing this issue by developing external SCADA 
monitoring systems. 
Security administrators use Vulnerability Assessment and 
Penetration Testing (VA/PT) tools to discover and exploit 
vulnerabilities. However, the active techniques of port 
scanning, service fingerprinting, and rapid probing hosts to 
determine vulnerabilities can negatively impact L4 production 
servers and L3 Process control systems. If the implementation 
of communication protocols is not robust because of poorly 
written network daemons or issues with legacy systems, a 
simple port scanning may result in slow performance or lead to 
a crash and subsequent denial of service. Hence, some 
organizations adopt network policies that forbid traditional 
VA/PT assessments on production networks. As a solution to 
this SCADA specific passive assessment tools are coming up, 
which do not impact production systems and can be automated 
to run only in non-peak hours. One significant problem these 
VA/PT tools can't resolve is that of protection of C&I servers 
from advanced malware exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities. 
Traditional defense mechanism like Intrusion Detection/ 
Prevention Systems (IDS/IPS) or Network Antivirus use 
signature based detection technologies and hence cannot detect 
zero-day threats. Modern security solutions like Malware 
Sandboxing systems are coming up which apply dynamic 
analysis of executable code in a virtual sandbox environment to 
proactively detect suspicious code behavior and block 
execution. 
Moreover, the threats to L5 systems generally arise due to 
operational negligence, inappropriate testing, vulnerable end-
points, wrongly defined security policies and even false 
perception of security. Hence, just an assumption that having 
industrial firewalls and VPN solutions offers sufficient 
protection, can pose significant threat at this layer. Datacenter 
managers must review compliance of clearly defined cyber 
security controls and verify implementation of necessary 
security patch updates. 
 
L6 IT Operation Network 
The L6 layer represents the VSM for IT operations of an 
ICS network. Fig. 8 depicts the VSM, which is divided into 
three parts viz. 'L6 IT Network Operations' (Management), 
'Datacenter Operations' and 'IT Network Resources' 
(Environment) as per VSM principles. This layer encompasses 
facility-related components that support enterprise IT 
operations like ERP, Mail, VPN, Intranet & Internet services 
etc. along with administration of remote Datacenters and 
Disaster Recovery sites. The Chief Information Officer (CIO) 
of the ICS enterprise centrally coordinates quality control and 
inspection audits of all L6 IT Operations.   Fig. 7 VSM for L5 ICS-DMZ Operations 
Fig. 8 VSM for L6 IT Network Operations 
The L6 IT Operation Network layer is very critical; in the 
sense, a security breach here provides a gateway to penetrate 
into lower levels. Also, the L6 systems & services are quite 
diverse in nature and more risk-prone due to connectivity with 
Internet. Hence, a plethora of security systems are required in 
this layer ranging from contemporary antivirus, firewalls, 
IDS/IPS, secure web/mail gateways to modern malware 
sandboxing, DLP (Data Loss Prevention) and SIEM (Security 
Information and Event Management) systems. SIEM systems 
provide a comprehensive platform to detect, monitor, record 
and analyze security events, for real-time identification of 
threats through centralized correlation of logs generated from 
various network entities like servers, end-user systems, 
firewalls etc. SIEMs empower security administrators by 
providing an all-in-one proactive security management solution 
to correlate events from multiple sources. SIEMs with 
advanced communication profiling technologies can also be 
extended to lower layers, which can detect suspicious attempts 
like sending of critical data through uncommon network paths. 
Often in L3, L4 and L5 operations, engineers have a detailed 
view of what their process is doing but no idea of what their 
network is doing. This is because; current security monitoring 
tools provide too much data and not enough information. The 
plant floor is flooded with data and alerts on potential safety, 
production, maintenance, inventory, and environmental issues. 
Security information gets lost in the noise. Hence, a good 
SIEM system must figure out how to get the right security 
information at the right time without generating false positives 
and without flooding the dashboard with unnecessary data. 
Another important aspect of the L6 layer is disaster 
management or the recovery of information/system after 
occurrence of an unavoidable intrusion/malware attack. To 
address this, virtualization technologies are heavily used for 
management of IT resources. Virtual Machine (VM) snapshots 
and clones can shrink-wrap operational systems for fast 
recovery and provide features like fail-over, High-Availability 
(HA) and Fault Tolerance (FT). Virtualization also helps in 
reduction of hardware maintenance & operational costs. 
Though the penetration of virtualization in lower layers is not 
as much as in L6 layer, but modern L3 SCADA systems and 
L4 production systems are adopting virtual infrastructure day 
by day. However, virtualization has increased the attack 
surface because of the hypervisor layer in the middle. A 
compromise of the hypervisor could result in the compromise 
of all hosted workloads/VMs. Also, the lack of visibility and 
controls on internal virtual networks created for VM-to-VM 
communications blinds network-based IPS/IDS systems. 
Hence, agent-less virtual anti-virus appliances are coming up 
that provides malware protection to VMs. Since these 
appliances provide an agent-less approach the processing 
doesn’t burden the individual VMs. The drawback to some of 
these appliances is that they only provide antivirus protection 
to VMs and not the additional application control, IDS/IPS and 
web filtering contained in more traditional appliances. Other 
security measures in virtualization may be like implementation 
of MAC address filtering, placing of virtual switches into 
promiscuous mode for packet inspection by SIEMs, 
introducing virtual firewalls for VMs in different VLANs etc. 
 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION INSIGHTS 
ICS security requires tight integration of information 
security and industrial control system expertise. Engineers 
know that control is impractical if the accuracy of inputs and 
the reliability of outputs are questionable. Security experts 
know that security without integration with operations is 
ineffective. All this is known for years, and may seem obvious, 
but this relationships, interactions and organizational issues 
(management, coordination etc.) can't be neglected if security 
issues are to be addressed. One of the striking features of the 
proposed ICS VSM is that it is built upon these relationships, 
which makes it easy adaptable and automatable for industry 
practitioners to implement it in the real world. The inherent 
structure of VSM dynamics is highly employee-oriented, with 
a segregated level of trust and control at different levels. Each 
managerial entity of the model is provisioned with only 
necessary & sufficient control authorities based on the 
principal of least privilege. Similarly, each operational entity is 
restricted to do only requisite operations that are intended for 
them with minimum deviation from their original line of work. 
This tends to equate the adaptation requirements of both 
security and operational workforce, because it streamlines the 
best practices of both the worlds. The VSM model clearly 
demonstrates how the managers at each layer have to identify 
the demands of security expertise, while maintaining the focus 
on operations and environment.  
Also, the higher the level of VSM, the more stringent is the 
requirement to balance the demands of different entities and 
steer the system as a whole. The lessons learnt from the above 
analysis of each VSM layer reveal that, defense-in-depth 
security strategies for various entities depend on their positions 
within the VSMs. This is where the key benefit of 
implementing ICS VSM lies. It identifies the important areas 
where security control is needed while depicting the impact of 
their compromise on other entities as well. This helps security 
decision makers make the right decision by enabling them to 
put more emphasis on the critical areas. The ICS VSM brings 
out the insight that security initiatives at a particular VSM layer 
not just protects the entities within the layer, but also is 
responsible for the security of the recursive entities in the 
layers below & above it. Hence, with VSM as a reference, the 
decision makers are empowered to adopt a much more graded 
approach for implementation of security controls. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The paper demonstrated the application of principles of 
VSM to holistically model the critical cyber-physical systems 
of an ICS infrastructure. The recursive nature of VSM helped 
in identifying the relationships & interactions among the self-
organizing & self-regulatory subsystems of ICS infrastructure. 
From the context of VSM it is evident that the viability of the 
whole ICS network is inextricably linked with the viability of 
its subsystems at different recursion levels and therefore each 
subsystem functions as a VSM in itself. The VSMs from the L7 
ICS management layer to the L1 field device network provided 
a framework to understand the complexity of C&I systems and 
helped in the analysis of their susceptibility against modern 
cyber-attacks. The paper discussed some key security issues in 
each VSM layer and their respective mitigation measures. A 
detailed granular security analysis of all practical possibilities 
at each layer is not addressed in this paper, as the intention was 
to just introduce the promising potential of VSM as a vehicle to 
drive ICS security decisions. 
The paper also discussed how the implementation of ICS 
VSM empowers the industry practitioners & security decision 
makers to successfully identify critical areas of ICS networks 
and implement requisite security controls at different levels of 
recursion. The proposed ICS VSM serves as a dynamic tool to 
specify information flows, identify bottlenecks, design system 
strategies and examine missing components that hinder 
security mitigation efforts. The VSM can also be used as input 
to regular risk management tools. Furthermore, a quantitative 
risk evaluation process can be developed that can make use of 
the findings of the VSM to compute risks. As part of future 
work attribute-based modeling schemes are being evaluated, 
where each sub-component will embody certain characteristics 
based on its position within the VSMs and integrate them with 
decision and game theoretic models to quantify their behavior 
in different situations. 
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